INTRODUCTION
Persons institutionalized in psychiatric institutions and facilities for persons with intellectual disabilities have always been hidden from view. 1 Facilities were often constructed far from major urban centers, availability of transportation to such institutions was often limited, and those who were locked up were, to the public, faceless and seen as less than human. 2 Although there were sporadic exposés in the nineteenth century and the mid-twentieth century that attempted to shed light on the way these individuals were being forced to live, 3 it was not until the civil rights revolution reached psychiatric hospitals and facilities for persons with intellectual disabilities in the early 1970s that there was any true public awareness of the conditions in such facilities. 4 This increased recognition of the deplorable conditions which were the norm then led to an "explosion" of litigation on behalf of those in psychiatric hospitals or facilities for developmental disabilities, further raising awareness in the public and the courts nationwide. 5 
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[5:2 there was an independent showing of such dangerousness that he could not safely be housed elsewhere. 20 Also, the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 21 has called into question the legality of placing all incompetent patients-no matter what their individual level of dangerousness or their charged offense-in maximum security facilities, solely by nature of the fact that there is a criminal detainer lodged against them. 22 A critical question that remains mostly unanswered for forensic hospitals is the extent of a patient's perceived dangerousness that is required for such secure hospital commitment as opposed to what is acceptable prior to transfer to a nonsecure facility. 23 The question of dangerousness required has been and remains an important one in the minds of patients, those treating them, and the public at large. While some judges and legislators in the United States have begun to directly address the issue, a fair amount of ambiguity remains. 24 This ambiguity-along with the lack of agreement and clarification by the courts-may ultimately lead to a for commitment or the opportunity for release . . . Indiana The different "tracks" in the N.Y. system are explained infra text accompanying notes 45-50. Ironically, many "non-secure" facilities are becoming increasingly locked down, and it is becoming more difficult to tell the differences between the levels of dangerousness required by these facilities, which should in theory be readily distinguishable. 24 Transfers are, of course, often based on (usually informal) risk assessments. See infra text accompanying notes 89-91 on the inherent ambiguity often present in such assessment decisionmaking. At least one court has ruled that, as the question before it was "only with requests for transfer from one mental hospital to another, and not with requests for release, the concern for psychiatric predictions of dangerousness [ violation of a person's right to be confined in the least restrictive alternative, a right that applies in all settings to all patients confined in hospitals. 25 This potential for the violation of patients' rights is especially troubling because of recent developments in international human rights law, especially the ratification of the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). 26 As we will discuss below, the CRPD is the most revolutionary international human rights document ever created that applies to persons with disabilities. 27 It furthers the human rights approach to disability-endorsing a social model and repudiating a purely medical model-and recognizes the right of people with disabilities to equality in most every aspect of life. 28 Although little attention has been paid to its potential impact on forensic patients, 29 we believe it is essential that there be a new focus notwithstanding the fact that virtually no consideration of the Convention's application to this population yet appears in the literature. 30 This Article will address these issues individually and together as they appear in the United States and under international law principles. 31 We will consider "risk" in two ways: first, the need for clinicians to be able to assess a patient's risk in both secure and non-secure facilities and second, the legal risk to clinicians if their assessment is wrong. We will also address "security" because an emphasis on safety is at the forefront of the minds of the public as well as judges involved in cases where dangerousness is considered. 32 We will also discuss 25 See "danger" as it is the basis for many statutes governing confinement of the mentally ill, and "dangerousness" itself is a particularly indefinable term in this context. Finally, we will discuss the issue of "human rights" because of the importance of the CRPD as well as the importance of ensuring fair treatment in all nations. We are then faced with the "clinician's dilemma," which occurs each time a treatment provider attempts to combine these previously-described topics into a formula to apply to his patients. This dilemma is made more obvious by the discordance in case law and statutes, as well as organized psychiatry's reliance on dangerousness predictions that continue to be unreliable at best, and prejudicial at worst. We will also consider all of the issues in question through the prism of TJ in an effort to determine whether current policies are, in fact, therapeutic or antitherapeutic and whether or not they reflect the "ethic of care" mandated by TJ. 33 The first portion of the title of this paper comes from Every Grain of Sand, 34 one of Bob Dylan's very saddest and most beautifully-imaged songs; 35 one, according to the critic Paul Williams that "reaches beyond its context to communicate a deeply felt devotional spirit based on universal experiences: pain of self-awareness, and sense of wonder or awe," and is about "the moment(s) [that] we accept our pain and vulnerability." 36 We believe, as we will discuss subsequently in the Article, that the lyric in question truly defines the conundrum we face.
I. FORENSIC AND SECURE FACILITIES

A. Introduction
To confront the questions that we raise in this paper, it is necessary to first consider the extent of dangerousness that is required for secure hospital commitment versus transfer to a non-secure facility-a question that was first raised to one of the authors (MLP) over eleven years ago by the then-head of the Kirby Forensic Center in New York City, one of New York state's two maximum same quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause and are reflected in prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia and ethnic bigotry." See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin 
B. New York State Law
We will focus here on New York developments. Under the relevant statute, New York Criminal Procedure Law section 330.20(1)(c), the term "dangerous mental disorder" means: (i) that a defendant currently suffers from a "mental illness" and (ii) that "because of such condition he currently constitutes a physical danger to himself or others." 39 If we examine the New York Court of Appeals' decisions from the past two decades, certain controlling principles emerge.
It is constitutionally permissible for the state to engage in a presumption that a defendant's "causative mental illness" has continued beyond the date of the original conduct (that would have been criminal but for the defendant's lack of criminal responsibility), 40 and a finding of current danger may be made:
by presenting proof of a history of prior relapses into violent behavior, substance abuse or dangerous activities upon release or termination of psychiatric treatment, or upon evidence establishing that continued medication is necessary to control defendant's violent tendencies and that defendant is likely not to comply with prescribed medication because of a prior history of such noncompliance or because of threats of future noncompliance. 41 Extended supervision is justified, in significant part, because of the "inability of modern psychiatry to guarantee the safety of the public through effective The statute contemplates a three-tier track system. 45 Those suffering from a "dangerous mental disorder" (Track 1) 46 are subject to "continued, direct oversight." 47 Those "mentally ill" (for these purposes, persons whose illnesses require inpatient care and treatment that is essential to the defendant's welfare, and who, because of impaired judgment, do not understand the need for such care and treatment) (Track 2) are governed by the civil commitment laws. 48 Those who are neither mentally ill nor dangerous under these definitions (Track 3) are entitled to immediate release with or without conditions. 49 Other factors to consider in determining whether a Track 2 acquittee needs continued retention in a non-secure facility include:
 the need to prepare for a safe and stable transition from non-secure commitment to release,  evidence of recent acts of violence and the risk of harm to the defendant or others,  the nature of the conduct that resulted in the initial commitment,  the likelihood of relapse or a cure,  history of substance or alcohol abuse, 42 In re Francis S., 663 N.  the effects of medication,  the likelihood that the patient will discontinue medication without supervision,  the length of confinement and treatment,  the lapse of time since the underlying criminal acts, and  "any other relevant factors that form a part of an insanity acquittee's psychological profile." 50
C. Constitutional Dimensions
With this statutory predicate, we must also consider the constitutional imperative that we apply the concept of the least restrictive alternative to all institutional mental disability law decision making. There is no question that the constitutional mandate of providing the least restrictive alternative (LRA)-first famously spelled out in a mental disability law context well over forty years ago in the case of Lessard v. Schmidt 51 -applies to all aspects of institutional decision making, whether they involve civil patients or forensic patients. This broad application has been made clear by the US Supreme Court, other relevant federal courts, and the New York state courts.
In Lessard, the federal district court ruled that "even if the standards for an adjudication of mental illness and potential dangerousness are satisfied, a court should order full-time involuntary hospitalization only as a last resort." 52 Quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 53 the court characterized "the most basic and fundamental right [as] the right to be free from unwanted restraint," 54 concluding that "persons suffering from the condition of being mentally ill but who are not alleged to have committed any crime, cannot be totally deprived of their liberty if there are less drastic means for achieving the same basic goal." 55 The court placed the burden for exploring alternatives to institutionalization on "the person recommending full-time involuntary hospitalization," 56 who must prove the following:
(1) what alternatives are available; (2) what alternatives were investigated; and (3) why the investigated alternatives were not deemed suitable. These alternatives include voluntary or court-ordered out-patient treatment, day treatment in a hospital, night treatment in a hospital, placement in the custody of a friend or These principles have been articulated in multiple New York state cases, dating back to the 1973 decision of Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous: 58 "To subject a person to a greater deprivation of personal liberty than necessary to achieve the purpose for which he is being confined is, it is clear, violative of due process." 59 Subsequent New York cases have been in accord. By way of example, Ughetto v. Acrish states the principle this way: "The burden of proof at such a hearing is upon the hospital to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the patient poses a substantial threat to himself or others and that involuntary commitment is the least restrictive means available for treatment." 60 Courts in other jurisdictions have specifically ruled that the LRA principles apply to the transfer of patients from a less secure hospital to a more secure hospital. 61 Although this issue has never been dealt with squarely by a New York court, the Mental Hygiene Legal Services ex rel. Aliza K. v. Ford 62 decision (which did not require a full due process hearing prior to the transfer of a patient to a more secure facility) indicated that, where the "stigma of being a patient at [the more secure facility] may be greater than that of being hospitalized at [the less secure facility, such a] transfer implicates a liberty interest which triggers rights to procedural due process," 63 citing Kesselbrenner and the US Supreme Court's prisonhospital transfer case of Vitek v. Jones. 64 The LRA principle has been articulated in two very different ways in three US Supreme Court cases. In 1990, in Riggins v. Nevada, 65 reversing a conviction in a case where a competent defendant pleading the insanity defense was medicated at trial against his will, the Court ruled that such medication would only be allowed if the state proved either of the following: that (1) the treatment was "medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of Riggins' own safety or the safety of others," or (2) there were no less intrusive means by which to obtain an adjudication of the defendant's guilt or innocence. 66 
57
Id 68 Both before and after its decision in Olmstead, the Supreme Court has ruled that the ADA applies to prison settings; 69 it is inconceivable that a court would rule that it does not apply to a forensic mental health facility. 70 In short, there is no question that the LRA applies to all cases of persons institutionalized because of mental disabilities, including forensic patients. 71 One of the authors (MLP) has previously argued that this is specifically demanded by the ADA, and we believe that the arguments made there apply specifically to the cases we are discussing in this paper. 72
II. ON RISK
As discussed above, the word "risk" carries with it multiple meanings in the context of making determinations about dangerousness, and those determinations affect a patient's level of confinement. 73 First, there is the risk posed by the patient "significant" state interests, the Court underscored that this could only be done if "any alternative, less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results. 74 However, there is also risk in the context of clinician error. The risk of an inaccurate prediction of dangerousness can have serious consequences for the clinician who made the prediction, as well as anyone harmed by the inaccurately assessed, dangerous individual. 75 Further, societal beliefs about the inherent danger posed by all mentally ill individuals put pressure on clinicians to make accurate assessments, 76 but with that comes pressure to keep individuals with mental illness confined, even when dangerousness may not actually be at issue, or the finding of dangerousness may be tenuous at best. 77 Even the Supreme Court has recognized the "fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis" and the issues that then arise when individuals are deprived of their basic freedoms based on this fallibility. 78 Dangerousness itself, as a concept, is also a difficult one, 79 given that it can mean many things in many different contexts, and the fear of dangerousness can have 81 As a result of these dilemmas, there is extra pressure on clinicians and state officials to always err on the side of retaining patients in more secure conditions, such decisions being unlikely to result in tart criticism. 82 If the patients involved are forensic patients (thus explicitly having had some contact with the criminal justice system), these decisions become even easier to justify.
A. The Elasticity of the Word "Dangerousness" and its Multiple Meanings.
Twenty-two years ago, in writing about the application of the then-new field of "therapeutic jurisprudence" 83 to involuntary civil commitment law, one of the authors (MLP) and two colleagues said this about the "revolution" in commitment law in the 1970s:
Not incidentally, the initiation of more formal hearings forced medical personnel to alter the manner in which they testified. For the first time, psychiatrists were subjected to rigorous cross-examination and were required to substantiate their medical opinions rather than merely make medical conclusions. At the same time, psychiatric diagnostic and predictive skills were more closely scrutinized. Lawyers were often successful in convincing courts that psychiatric diagnoses and predictions of dangerousness were inaccurate. The meaning of dangerousness also became an important area of litigation. Critics charged that the concept was "vague" and "amorphous," and its "elasticity" has made it "one of the most problematic and elusive concepts in mental health law." 84 Nothing has changed since the publication of that article over two decades ago. There are few words in the legal literature as elastic as "dangerousness," 85 an elasticity that is even more singular in light of the fact that it is a word no longer in good currency with researchers and clinicians, who have reconceptualized the angerousness is a concept which involves substantial elements of vagueness and ambiguity," 90 and the court acknowledged the "difficulty of making valid and meaningful predictions of the likelihood of future harmful conduct" 91 made more difficult by the "subtle but strong pressures upon decision makers to overpredict dangerousness." 92 In the same opinion, the court noted that "[a] defendant may be dangerous in only certain types of situations or in connection with relationships with certain individuals" and that any "evaluation of dangerousness in such cases must take into account the likelihood that defendant will be exposed to such situations or come into contact with such individuals." 93 Interestingly, Krol, an insanity acquittee case, was one of the first important state court cases to demand individualized risk assessments (without using that 86 See 
B. The Most Recent Research on the Ability of Mental Health Professionals to Predict Dangerousness to Any Level of Medical Certainty
The next question to confront is that of the accuracy of psychiatric predictions, 100 and here it is necessary to begin with the work of Professor John Monahan. 101 Monahan's research is crystal clear and uncontroverted: unstructured clinical assessments of dangerousness are neither valid nor reliable, 102 and, at best, they allow clinicians to distinguish violent from non-violent patients "with a modest, better-than-chance level of accuracy." 103 By contrast, there are structured risk assessment tools-employing different means of statistical or actuarial risk assessment-now available that, by any measure of reckoning, 104 are superior to the unstructured assessments traditionally used. 105 Hanson and Morton-Bourgon discuss the use of risk assessment tools as they relate to predictions of dangerousness, and how these predictions have become standard practice in many areas of law. In particular, those working with sex offenders are particularly conscious of risk assessment tools. Measures such as the STATIC-99 and STATIC-2002 have become, in many jurisdictions, the sole measure of dangerousness prediction in many cases of civil commitment of a sex offender when determining his future dangerousness. While some risk assessment measures may have limited success in predicting actual recurrence of offenses, it is frequently the case that these tools will over-predict the likelihood of re-offense. Risk assessments measure "static" and "dynamic" factors based on the individual, but often do not have reliable predictability. Recent meta-analyses of the most popular risk assessment measures have showed that, even with the addition of multiple factors supposedly linked to recidivism, the predictive capabilities of these risk assessment measures has not dramatically increased beyond its standard percentage of accuracy.
However, it is important to note that this meta-analysis also showed less predictive capability in the unstructured professional judgment risk assessment determination than any of the actuarial tools. While risk assessment for dangerousness in general for violent crimes and specifically for sex offender recidivism is still not an entirely reliable or even, in the case of some less-tested instruments, a valid measurement, it still prevails over the use of the "professional judgment" standard in any study of effectiveness. In short, if forensic clinicians are not using the sort of structural tools discussed by Professor Monahan, 109 then, simply, their predictions-though, in hindsight, sometimes accurate-are not grounded on a valid and reliable scientific basis. 110 What is especially interesting here is that in at least two of its cases in this area of the law, the New York Court of Appeals has identified imprecision of psychiatric predictivity of dangerousness as a basis for its finding that "psychiatry cannot now guarantee the safety of the public from future dangerous acts of persons found not responsible . . . and will most likely be unable to do so in the foreseeable future" 111 and as a rationale for relying on legislative categorizations in this area of the law." 112 This decision is a mixed blessing for clinicians and attorneys working in the field of mental disability law. 113 While it is important to recognize the inability of risk assessment techniques to deliver precise predictions about dangerousness and recidivism, it may be equally improper to allow an, at times, uninformed legislature to "categorize" types of defendants based on their symptoms or diagnosis. The New York Court of Appeals is correct in its decision to move away from the traditional reliance on risk assessment measures, but it may be allowing a practice of legislating dangerousness that will result in overbroad and far-reaching categorizations of defendants.
While New York has a clear set of guidelines it follows in order to classify its defendants and their anticipated levels of dangerousness, international mental disability law continues to evolve and change based on worldwide developments and increased understanding of mental illness and dangerousness. 114 As we will discuss further, the CRPD was a driving force in re-energizing a worldwide recognition of the concepts of mental illness and dangerousness and how they relate to individuals in psychiatric facilities. 115
C. The Danger of Erroneous Diagnosis by Clinicians, and the Constitutional Problems it Creates
Ultimately, the question must be asked: does the Constitution allow for an individual to be confined indefinitely and deprived of his liberties based on expert testimony in a field that rapidly changes and constantly redefines the parameters of dangerousness, risk, and illness itself? Although psychiatry and psychiatric diagnosis are accepted practices used to establish the criteria for civil commitment, there has never been a challenge in front of the court that argued that the risk of clinician error should be weighed against the diagnosis made and its ultimate consequences. Notwithstanding this fact, we believe that this is a reasonable question to consider.
The Supreme Court, in Addington v. Texas, 116 made it crystal-clear that the reasonable-doubt standard is inappropriate when individuals are being confined based on a psychiatric diagnosis. 117 The very nature of diagnoses is "based on medical 'impressions' drawn from subjective analysis and filtered through the experience of the diagnostician." 118 Even with safeguards that act to quantify diagnostic categories, such as the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (often characterized as the "gold standard" of classification 119 ), the subjectivity of a clinician's diagnosis may be a constitutional problem. The Addington Court has come closest to authentically confronting the potential legal issues inherent in an erroneous psychiatric diagnosis with respect to civil commitment. 120 The Court there chose to recognize the subjectivity inherent in diagnosing complex psychiatric behaviors and used a constitutional analysis to implement a more appropriate standard than a simple preponderance quantum. 121 However, no reported case as of yet has challenged an erroneous diagnosis and subsequent civil commitment on a constitutional basis. 122 Those diagnoses are based on evidence of disability that is "well-documented throughout childhood" whereas clinicians treating patients with mental illness often do not have the luxury of a complete history of behaviors. 123 In fact, the Court in Heller specifically recognized the differences between the two types of diagnosis and stated, "as we recognized in an earlier case, diagnosis of mental illness is difficult," citing to Addington. 124 The potential for error seems to be recognized; however, there has been no effort made to address the effects or consequences of erroneous diagnosis. 125 This lack of adjustment in the law based on what is now known about the potential for erroneous diagnosis may, however, not be solely due to lack of recognition and effort. The conflation of risk with psychiatric diagnosis, made everpresent by ongoing sanism 126 and heuristics, 127 will lead to an imbalance in the weighing of erroneous diagnosis versus unconstitutional confinement. Judges concerned with their reputations (and, in some instances, their chances of reelection) 128 will lean more heavily in favor of commitment regardless of the risk of clinician error, which is unquantifiable and is virtually never presented as a defense. 129 When clinicians go through the process of making an informed diagnosis, they are rarely concerned with "the law"; there is no safety measure built in to the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 130 to ensure that an erroneous diagnosis does not lead to a future of unconstitutional commitment and stigma. 131 The law has only recently started to understand the fallibility of risk assessment through a constitutional lens. (1976) , arguing that "wise and benevolent paternalism," should lead to a "moral judgment" that hospitalization is appropriate for patients "incapable of voluntarily accepting help," in spite of laws rejecting "need of treatment" as a commitment standard.
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[5:2 danger of erroneous diagnosis is the next logical step for the court to take, following on the hints of understanding of the devastating consequences of erroneous commitment alluded to in Addington and Heller.
III. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW PRINCIPLES 132
Given the ratification of the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 133 (CRPD), the state of the law as it relates to persons with disabilities must be radically reconsidered. 134 The CRPD is "regarded as having finally empowered the 'world's largest minority' to claim their rights and to participate in international and national affairs on an equal basis with others who have achieved specific treaty recognition and protection." 135 This Convention-the most revolutionary international human rights document ever created that applies to persons with disabilities 136 -furthers the human rights approach to disability and recognizes the right of people with disabilities to equality in most every aspect of life. 137 It firmly endorses a social model of disability as it reconceptualizes mental health rights as disability rights. The Convention is a clear and direct repudiation of the medical model that traditionally was part-and-parcel of mental disability law. 138 The Convention-"ushering in a new era of disability rights policy" 139 -"sketches the full range of human rights that apply to all human beings, all with a particular application to the lives of persons with disabilities." 140 It provides a framework for ensuring that mental health laws "fully recognises the rights of those with mental illness," 141 and mandates prescriptive rights in addition to proscriptive rights. 142 There is no question that the Convention has "ushered in a new era of disability rights policy." 143 Disability is a condition that arises from "interaction with various barriers [that] may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others" instead of inherent limitations. 144 The Convention extends existing human rights to take into account the specific rights experiences of persons with disabilities, 145 calling for "respect for inherent dignity" 146 and "nondiscrimination." 147 Other articles declare "freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment," 148 "freedom from exploitation, violence and abuse," 149 and a right to protection of the "integrity of the person." 150 Equality and nondiscrimination are cornerstones of the CRPD's mission. Nations must "recognize that all persons are equal before and under the law," and "prohibit all discrimination on the basis of disability and guarantee to persons with disabilities equal and effective legal protection against discrimination on all grounds." 151 The CRPD not only clarifies that states should not discriminate against persons with disabilities, but it also sets out explicitly the many steps that states must take to create an enabling environment so that persons with disabilities can enjoy authentic equality in society. 152 155 In one such case Surrogate Judge Kristen Booth Glen noted that that the CRPD was entitled to "'persuasive weight' in interpreting our own laws and constitutional protections." 156 International human rights law demands-at the very least-individualized assessments of risk prior to the imposition of restrictions that limit the liberty of a patient, whether civil or forensic. By way of example, New York's multi-tier system 157 may run afoul of the CRPD's Article 5, which, if interpreted broadly, could prohibit all discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 158 In practice, individuals with conditions predetermined to pose a risk can be transferred to a more secure facility without a full due process hearing. 159 Article 5 of the CRPD may provide a basis on which to claim that it is improper to discriminate based on the type of diagnosed disability, and that all transfers, regardless of diagnosed conditions, warrant a full due process hearing. In fact, strong arguments have been made that international human rights law calls into question all currently-existing domestic civil commitment schemes, especially if involuntary treatment is a possible "side product" of such commitment. 160 The UN's Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has, in a general comment, stated that "forced treatment . . . is a violation of [Articles 15, 16 and 17 of the CRPD]." 161 The same Committee has characterized the segregation of persons with disabilities in institutions as "a pervasive and insidious problem that violates a number of rights guaranteed under the Convention." 162 An annual report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights is similarly quite clear: "Legislation authorizing the institutionalization of persons with disabilities on the grounds of their disability without their free and informed consent must be abolished." 163 The international framework has now been put in place by the UN and those nations that have ratified the CRPD. It now falls to the individual nations and courts to uphold these mandates in case law and put into practice what is so clearly expressed in the CRPD: individuals with disabilities are entitled to give 158 Lee, supra note 152, at 429. On the need for all participants in the forensic system to understand the significance of international human rights as they affect cases of persons with mental disabilities, see 165 a case involving a fourteen-year-old who suffered from permanent brain damage as a result of an accident on a field that was the property of the Argentinean army, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in ordering reparations and equitable relief, relied on the CRPD for the proposition that it was "imperative" that states adopt "affirmative measures to "respect and ensure human rights," "according to the particular protection needs" of the individual person, 166 so as to "promote social inclusion practices." 167 The fact that, by way of example, there is no right to a hearing under New York's track transfer scheme 168 falls afoul of the "affirmative measures" requirement mandated by the Furlan court.
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Elsewhere, in a child care case involving a potential loss of custody of a premature baby on the part of a mother with learning disabilities, the European Court of Human Rights found that the state's procedures provided an effective vehicle through which a guardian's actions could be challenged, and thus it found no violation of the CRPD. 169 However, in the course of its opinion, that court noted that, under the Convention, the state was obligated to provide "appropriate accommodation to facilitate disabled persons' effective role in legal proceedings." 170 Again, there is no evidence that such "appropriate accommodation[s]" are made in cases involving changes in track status in New York or parallel proceedings in other domestic jurisdictions. 171 Even with mounting support in international human rights law, nations continue to ignore the basic rights given in the CRPD to individuals with disabilities. New York and other US jurisdictions have consistently failed to recognize the need for a more comprehensive due process system for individuals who are to be transferred to a secure facility. The international cases that appropriately recognize the rights of individuals with disabilities show that there is widespread recognition of the importance of giving a voice to these marginalized 164 On the implications of such arguments for the viability of mental status defenses in the criminal law, see Perlin, supra note 29 (both the incompetency status and the insanity defense are compatible with and required by the CRPD individuals. It is the hope of these authors that the United States follows suit and ends the pervasive patterns and practices of discriminatory legislation. In a recent paper, one of the authors (MLP) and another co-author focused on six issues involving forensic patients that needed to be re-conceptualized in light of these developments: 172  Although there is a robust literature on the CRPD and on the UN Convention against Torture, there is virtually no mention of the plight of forensic patients. So, even within the world of those who focus broadly on these human rights issues, this population has remained invisible.  Conditions at forensic facilities around the world continue to "shock the conscience," and it is essential that any "anti-torture" publication (such as this one) highlight this.  Even when regional courts and commissions have found international human rights violations in cases involving forensic patients (e.g., Victor Rosario Congo v. Ecuador) 173 , the discussion of these cases largely ignores the plaintiffs' statuses as forensic patients  There are few lawyers and fewer "mental disability advocates" providing legal and advocacy services to this population,  There is little mention in the survivor movement literature about the specific plight of forensic patients.  Forensic patients in facilities for persons with intellectual disabilities are particularly absent from the discourse. 174 In the course of that paper, we argued that the treatment of forensic patients globally violated international human rights law principles. 175 We believe that it is imperative that institutional administrators begin to come to grips with the significance of these principles for the population in question.
A. Therapeutic Jurisprudence 176
One of the most important legal theoretical developments of the past two decades has been the creation and dynamic growth of therapeutic jurisprudence mandates that "law should value psychological health, should strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible, and when consistent with other values served by law, should attempt to bring about healing and wellness." 185 In this context, it has been suggested that psychological health is a "fundamental legal interest." 186 TJ utilizes socio-psychological insights into the law and its applications, 187 and it is also part of a growing comprehensive movement in the law toward establishing more humane and psychologically optimal ways of handling legal issues collaboratively, creatively, and respectfully. 188 TJ has thus been described as "a sea-change in ethical thinking about the role of law . . . a movement towards a more distinctly relational approach to the practice of law . . . which emphasise[s] psychological wellness over adversarial triumphalism." 189 TJ thus supports an ethic of care. 190 TJ and its practitioners place great importance on the principle of a commitment to dignity. 191 Professor Amy Ronner describes the "three Vs": voice, validation and voluntariness, 192 arguing: [5:2 What "the three Vs" commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If that litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard, and taken seriously the litigant's story, the litigant feels a sense of validation. When litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with a sense of voice and validation, they are more at peace with the outcome. Voice and validation create a sense of voluntary participation, one in which the litigant experiences the proceeding as less coercive. Specifically, the feeling on the part of litigants that they voluntarily partook in the very process that engendered the end result or the very judicial pronunciation that affects their own lives can initiate healing and bring about improved behavior in the future. In general, human beings prosper when they feel that they are making, or at least participating in, their own decisions. 193 The question to be posed here is this: to what extent are the practices and procedures discussed in this paper consonant with TJ? Do they best ensure that these principles written about by Professor Ronner-the principles of voluntariness, voice, and validation-be fulfilled in matters involving residents of forensic institutions? Certainly, there is little about what happens that is voluntary on the part of the patients; maximum security facilities bespeak involuntariness in se. 194 There is little evidence that the patients in question have much of a voice (if at all) in their treatment or in the conditions of their confinement. 195 Although we know that fairness and procedural justice inevitably increase compliance with court orders, 196 we also know that procedural justice is often solely lacking in all forensic facility decision making. 197 One of us (MLP), in writing some years ago about sexual autonomy in psychiatric hospitals, concluded, "Much of the case law ignores forensic patients entirely." 198 So do the developments expanding TJ concepts to institutionalized persons in general largely ignore forensic patients?
At the outset, there is no evidence that there is any requirement that New York's risk assessment measures comport with the ways that the behavioral community agrees are most likely to yield accurate and valid findings: through the use of the sort of structured risk assessment instruments urged by Professor Monahan and his colleagues. 199 In an assessment of the potential value of TJ in the rehabilitation of persons with severe mental illness, William Spaulding and his colleagues stress that "everyone is best served when the determinations of risk upon which restrictive interventions are based must be as accurate, precise, and complete as clinical technology allows." 200 This sort of assessment was specifically endorsed by the late Professor Bruce Winick-one of the two original "fathers" of TJ-in an article he wrote about applying the law therapeutically in domestic violence cases, one that relies extensively on Professor Monahan's work. 201 The risk management model, Prof. Winick noted, is supported by the principles of TJ, providing an individual with incentives through which "to modify his behavior in order to reduce the extent or restrictiveness of the conditions imposed by the court"; 202 such a model also provides incentives, Winick argues, to "minimize or avoid the interferences with [individuals'] liberty that are justified as a result of the determination that they are dangerous." 203 Beyond this, Professor Spaulding and his colleagues-in line with, though chronologically pre-dating, Professor Ronner's call for "voice"-conclude that, "If patients can become more involved in the risk evaluation itself, then patients' involvement in treatment can be fostered; thus more compliance with treatment and aftercare planning can be expected in the long run," 204 and they note that, "At the very least, involving patients in risk evaluations does not appear to have anti-therapeutic consequences." 205 There is, to the best of our knowledge, no such patient involvement in the New York system. With the stated outcome as treatment and recovery, it only makes sense that individuals are included and engaged in matters involving their hospitalization. 206 Jurisdictions that choose not So, what should be done? Here are some recommendations:
 It is absolutely essential that the LRA principles be considered in every case. As the highest court in the United States has routinely upheld a patient's right to be treated in the least restrictive environment, 210 it should be regarded as legally operative in determining the actual placement of all patients.
Freedom from a secure facility or an allegedly non-secure facility that has increasingly become secure is a right guaranteed by the concept of the LRA, when appropriate for the particular patient, and must considered in each case as a unique and individualized determination.  It is absolutely essential that each state develop a mechanism through which organized, dedicated counsel is available to all forensic patients. 211  It is absolutely essential that decision-makers familiarize themselves with the bases of international human rights law so as to insure that the rights guaranteed by the CRPD are applied to all forensic patients.  It is absolutely essential that decision-makers familiarize themselves with the basic principles of therapeutic jurisprudence so as to best insure that the three principles articulated by Professor Ronner-voice, voluntariness and validation-be honored in forensic facilities.  Finally, it is absolutely essential that all persons doing clinical evaluations familiarize themselves with John Monahan's recent writings on dangerousness predictions, on the failure of unstructured interviews, and on the need to use structured risk assessment tools.
We believe that if clinicians take these recommendations seriously, many of the dilemmas we have been discussing will be ameliorated. It is impossible for us to achieve meaningful mitigating change in our mental disability law system unless we begin to take these issues seriously and to re-envision the way we regulate the 210 See 
